The Evolution of US Army Combatives: From Bayonets to Brazilian Jiu-Jitsu and Beyond

Are you curious about the evolution of close combat directives for U.S. Army soldiers, from bayonet fighting to modern techniques emphasizing domination and position control? Interested in how the Gracie family influenced this transformation and how Brazilian Jiu-Jitsu became an essential part of the training? This article will answer your questions by exploring the document "The History of Army Combatives," generously shared by U.S. Army Fort Moore and The Maneuver Center of Excellence.

The History of Army Combatives is an integral part of the United States Army Combatives Course. You can find detailed information about the course structure and an overview of the theoretical content taught to students on the U.S. Army Fort Moore and The Maneuver Center of Excellence website.

According to the information on the website: 

The mission of the U.S. Army Combatives Course is to train Leaders and Soldiers in close quarters Combatives in order to instill the Warrior Ethos and prepare Soldiers to close with and defeat the enemy in hand to hand combat.

Introduction

Amidst the cacophony of modern warfare's advanced technology, there remains a timeless and visceral skill that can tip the scales of life and death on the battlefield: hand-to-hand combat. This primal art, honed through centuries, is not merely about physical prowess, but the embodiment of a warrior's spirit, discipline, and resilience. As drones and cyber warfare dominate headlines, the raw, unyielding necessity of Army Combatives emerges as the unspoken backbone of a soldier's survival toolkit. For in the chaotic dance of close-quarters combat, where bullets run dry and technology falters, it is the warrior's grit and mastery of hand-to-hand techniques that determine the ultimate victor.

The "History of Army Combatives" document serves as a vital resource for understanding the principles and evolution of hand-to-hand combat training in the U.S. Army.

Historical Perspective

The first U.S. Army Combatives Manual, published in 1852, was a translation of a French bayonet fighting manual by a young Captain George McClelland. Since then, the Army has maintained combatives training doctrine, though its effectiveness has varied. Bayonet fencing, outlined in the 1852 manual, was universally accepted in the U.S. Army and European-style armies until World War I exposed its shortcomings. The confined trench spaces rendered bayonet techniques ineffective, leading soldiers to prefer tools like entrenching shovels and grenades.

Early Foreign Influence

This period marked the first large-scale organized attempts to teach unarmed combat to soldiers. There were several attempts to teach Ju-Jitsu and Judo which had been known in the United States since even before President Theodore Roosevelt had trained with Yamashita Yoshitsugu - one of the best students of Kano Jigoro. In 1920, a training manual by CPT Allan Corstorphin Smith, a Judo black belt, was published at Ft. Benning, Georgia. However, the rapid expansion of armies during the World Wars left little time for complex martial arts techniques, leading to a decline in skill-based combatives training. Non-skill-based methods like Pugil sticks and bayonet assault courses gained prominence instead.

World War II

World War II saw renewed efforts in combatives training, with top names in boxing and wrestling enlisted to train troops. The most successful programs were influenced by British Commando training, led by William E. Fairbairn and Eric A. Sykes. Their "Gutter Fighting" method emphasized simple, effective techniques and aggressiveness. By the end of the war, thousands of soldiers were trained in their methods.

Post-War Years

Combatives training nearly ceased after World War II due to the lack of a “train-the-trainer” program. Without follow-up training plans, quality declined, and training was reduced to initial entry training by minimally trained drill sergeants. Attempts to introduce new techniques were generally unsuccessful due to the absence of a quality instruction mechanism. Notable exceptions included the Air Force and Marine Corps.

Air Force Instructor Course

In 1950, the Air Force Strategic Air Command, under General Curtis E. LeMay, implemented a Judo program. By 1962, nearly ten thousand instructors were trained at Stead Air Force Base, Nevada. The curriculum included Judo, Aikido, Karate, air police techniques, aircrew self-defense, judo tournament procedures, and more. However, the club-based nature of the training limited widespread proficiency.

Marine Corps Instructor Course

In 1988, the Marine Corps adopted the Linear Infighting Neural Override Engagement (LINE) Combat System, designed by MSgt Ron Donvito. It systematically taught techniques from traditional martial arts in an organized manner. Despite initial success, the program struggled due to its reliance on formal training settings and an emphasis on "deadly" techniques, which did not fit modern battlefield needs.

Meanwhile in Russia: SOMBO

The Russian military developed SOMBO, combining Judo and Greco-Roman Wrestling techniques. Its success was linked to its similarity to wrestling, making it easier to learn and less dependent on size and strength. SOMBO's competitive component spurred further training, though some believed it changed the techniques emphasized.

Note: combatpit.com uses the spelling "sambo".

Modern Combatives Techniques and influence of Gracie family

In 1995, the Commander of the 2nd Ranger Battalion ordered a reinvigoration of Combatives training within the battalion. This led to the discovery of serious issues with the existing techniques in the Army’s Combatives manual (FM 21-150, 1992). The Rangers felt that the techniques were ineffective and a waste of valuable training time. The Army had no program to produce qualified instructors or a system for implementing training, leaving it to local commanders' discretion. This resulted in inconsistent training, often conducted by martial arts hobbyists using whatever civilian techniques they had learned, if there was any training at all.

To address this, a committee headed by Matt Larsen was formed to develop a more effective program. J. Robinson, a Ranger combat veteran and head coach at the University of Minnesota wrestling program, evaluated the emerging program and advised that successful training must have a competitive aspect to motivate soldiers and include "live" sparring to foster a Combatives culture. The committee initially based the program on wrestling, boxing, and martial arts like Judo and Muay Thai. SOMBO was considered but ultimately dismissed due to a lack of qualified instructors.

After exploring different systems, the Rangers sent several men to train at the Gracie Ju-Jitsu Academy in Torrance, California. The Ju-Jitsu taught there met many of the battalion’s needs. The Gracies, originally taught by Meada Mitsuyo, a Kodokan representative, had refined their system to include a hierarchy of dominant body positions, providing a clear strategy for winning fights and an organized learning framework. It was easy to learn, had a competitive form, and was effective in one-on-one unarmed combat.

Rorion and Royce Gracie made three trips to the battalion over the next few years, and several Rangers trained at the Gracie Academy. During this time, Larsen developed a drill-based training program, a key element of the Modern Army Combatives Program.

As the system matured, Larsen realized the importance of practicing techniques at full speed against resistant opponents. This approach ensured that ineffective techniques were quickly abandoned. He also incorporated elements from other martial arts to fill tactical gaps in the Ju-Jitsu learned from the Gracies, which primarily focused on unarmed ground grappling.

Exploring various training methods from different martial arts revealed how they complemented each other and exposed their weaknesses. The concept of positional dominance from Ju-Jitsu was expanded to other combat ranges, blending techniques from wrestling, boxing, Muay Thai, and Judo. Weapons fighting lessons from Kali, Western martial arts, and the Rangers' infantry experience were also included. By September 11, 2001, a fully integrated system of Close Quarters Combat had been developed, providing a solid foundation for battlefield lessons.

Deeper dive: Brazilian Jiu-Jitsu: The Gentle Art of Ground Fighting

United States Army Combatives School

As the program grew, its success extended beyond the battalion. It spread to the rest of the Ranger Regiment, then throughout the infantry, and eventually, with the publication of Field Manual 3-25.150 in 2002, it became Army-wide doctrine. COL Mike Ferriter, Commander of the 11th Infantry Regiment, brought Matt Larsen over to establish a training course for the regiment's cadre, which became the Level I Combatives Instructor Course. As the need for more supervision arose, the Level II course was developed. These courses were initially limited to ground grappling due to skepticism from senior commanders.

With the start of fighting in Afghanistan, the U.S. Army Combatives School at Ft. Benning, Georgia, was already established to train instructors for the Infantry schools. The first two levels of Combatives Instructor qualification were in place, but the need to push training into operational units and make it battlefield applicable required a longer certification course for battalion master trainers, leading to the Level III course. An interview format was developed to gather lessons from soldiers involved in hand-to-hand combat. Hundreds of interviews were conducted, evolving the curriculum based on these lessons. Eventually, a higher level of training was required for managing Combatives programs in larger units, leading to the Level IV instructor course.

A Learning Program

The program continued to spread throughout the Army, although it faced opposition. Some perceived it as irrelevant to the battlefield due to its focus on ground grappling in the early stages and the tendency of young soldiers to identify too closely with civilian Mixed Martial Arts, which have little to do with soldiering. The tactical training methods taught in the Level III and IV courses were slow to become standard. Despite its popularity in some parts of the Army, the program risked failing to deliver realistic Combatives training to every soldier.

In 2009, Major General Mike Ferriter became the Commanding General of Ft. Benning. To revitalize the program, he brought together Combatives training experts from the Army and civilian experts in a symposium to find improvement methods. A major contributor was Greg Thompson, the head instructor for the Special Operations Combatives Program (SOCP) School at Ft. Bragg, NC. Thompson refined the tactical instruction and created new techniques, which were incorporated into the new program. The curricula of the Level I and II courses were updated with new tactical techniques previously taught in the Level III, IV, and SOCP courses, and the courses were renamed the Basic Combatives Course and the Tactical Combatives Course.

Directives for the U.S. Army According to the Document

Today, the Modern Army Combatives Program stands as a testament to the effectiveness of integrating diverse martial arts techniques and the enduring influence of the Gracie family's Ju-Jitsu in shaping the Army's hand-to-hand combat training.

By embracing the principles of live training and positional dominance, the U.S. Army has created a comprehensive combatives program that equips soldiers with the skills and confidence needed to face the challenges of close-quarters combat on the modern battlefield.

Developing a Basic Fight Strategy: Essential Training for Soldiers

In the realm of military training, efficiency and effectiveness are paramount. To train soldiers effectively in hand-to-hand combat, it is essential to adopt a systematic approach to both fighting and training. The foundation of this approach lies in basic ground-fighting techniques, which build a fundamental understanding of dominant body positions. This understanding serves as a critical stepping stone before progressing to more advanced techniques.

The Universal Fight Plan and Its Limitations

When two untrained fighters engage in combat, they instinctively resort to a universal fight plan: exchanging blows until one is too damaged to continue. While many martial arts training programs aim to enhance this strategy, it has significant drawbacks:

• Unarmed Combat: One or both fighters may be unarmed.
• Skill Dependency: Progress relies solely on skill development.
• Advantages of Physical Attributes: Bigger, stronger, and faster fighters naturally have an edge, requiring extensive skill training to overcome these advantages.

A Strategic Approach to Fighting

The Army Combatives Program takes a more efficient approach by teaching fighting within the context of strategy. Basic techniques are used as metaphors to educate soldiers on the fundamental fight strategy. Soldiers learn to control the elements of a fight: range, angle, and level. The program identifies four key ranges:

1. Projectile
2. Striking
3. Clinching
4. Grappling

According to the specific circumstances of a conflict, soldiers can use certain techniques to disable an opponent or force them to submit.

Soldier's Tactical Options

In combat, a soldier's primary objective is to create space between themselves and their attacker, allowing them to transition to their primary weapon. If this is not possible, they must maintain space to transition to a secondary weapon or close the distance to gain a dominant position and finish the fight.

• Create Space: Establish enough space to transition to the primary weapon.
• Maintain Space: If unable to create sufficient space, maintain it to transition to a secondary weapon or close the distance.
• Close the Distance: Instill the courage to close the distance with the enemy, a defining characteristic of a warrior.
• Gain Dominant Position: Understanding and achieving dominant position is fundamental to proficient fighting.
• Finish the Fight: Attempt finishing techniques from a dominant position; if a technique fails, try again from a secure position.

Superior Tactics Over Skill

Dominating an opponent is not solely dependent on skill but on employing effective and efficient tactics. This is exemplified by Royce Gracie's success in the early Ultimate Fighting Championships. Gracie, trained in Brazilian Ju-Jitsu, was able to dominate opponents by taking them out of their game plan, demonstrating the effectiveness of superior tactics.

In summary, the basic fight strategy for training soldiers emphasizes a systematic approach, focusing on controlling the elements of the fight and employing superior tactics. This approach ensures that soldiers are better prepared to face the challenges of close-quarters combat, maximizing their effectiveness on the battlefield.